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As counterintuitive as it might sound, “sustainability” and the commitment to
“problem avoidance” rather than “problem solving” are, at least according to David
Deutsch, very dangerous ideas. And in this regard, our near-universally pursued
policy direction in response to the problem of global warming—that of trying to
limit carbon emissions by means of limiting economic activity—is also very dan-
gerous because it represents, at its core, a commitment to both those ideas. e
best explanation for why we are making this mistake is the “debtor-creditor” and
“pleasure-driven” conception of punishment, as it is explained by Friedrich Niet-
zsche.
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1. Introduction
As counterintuitive as it might sound, “sustainability” and the commitment
to “problem avoidance” rather than “problem solving” are, at least accord-
ing to David Deutsch, very dangerous ideas. And in this regard, our near-
universally pursued policy direction in response to the problem of global
warming—that of trying to limit carbon emissions bymeans of limiting eco-
nomic activity—is also very dangerous because it represents, at its core, a
commitment to both those ideas.e best explanation for why we are mak-
ing this mistake is the “debtor-creditor” and “pleasure-driven” conception of
punishment, as it is explained by Friedrich Nietzsche.
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2. David Deutsch & the sustainability fallacy
David Deutsch is a physicist who pioneered the studies of multiverse theory
and quantum computation. . .he also believes (correctly) that we are mis-
taken in our understanding of climate change. He is not a climate “denier”
as the term has come to be understood (someone who denies the role of
human impact on the warming of our planet). He accepts and endorses the
science that links CarbonDioxide (CO2) admissions and the warming of the
biosphere. Where he disagrees with the consensus, is on the philosophical
implications of that scientic reality—that is, what we should do in response
to climate change.
e problem is the idea, now near-universally embraced, of “sustain-
ability.” To understand Deutsch’s objection to sustainability he rst takes us
back on a short history lesson concerning human progress, beginning with
the origin of our species in the Great Ri Valley. Just as all other species
do, we rst evolved in that corner of Eastern Africa with genes specically
suited for surviving within that environment. We lived, (once again) just as
all other species do, the “natural,” “sustainable” existence forwhich our genes
intended. And it was “sheer hell[!]”, “nasty, brutish and short doesn’t begin
to describe how horrible it was.” 1 But more importantly, it nearly killed us,
just as has been the case with all other species that exist or have ever existed
on this planet.
Yet according to most people’s metric for quantifying sustainability,
things were perfect. e skies were blue and the waterways were pristine—
all around the environment was as near to being untouched, unchanged and
unpolluted by human beings as would be imaginably possible. Yet we never
lived suchmiserable lives, dened nearly entirely by suering. Wewere con-
stantly insecure: fearing the attacks of predators, the agony of starvation and
constantly enduring the pains of extreme weather. And beyond this, various
types of micro-organisms and bacteria were evolving specically to kill hu-
man beings, such as cholera bacillus. e sustainability movement tends to
imagine that the problem with global warming is that “We” are “polluting”
the planet—yet even if this was the right way to see the problem, the exact
opposite was the case for nearly all of our history. Rather than human beings
“polluting” the biosphere, the biosphere was in fact “polluting” the human
beings (as well as all other life) within it.
We hear the statement that “of all the species to have ever lived on this
planet, 99,99% have become extinct” so oen that its meaning tends to pass
us by.at is, in spite of the best genes, and constant improvements in those
1 SamHarris “Surviving theCosmos: AConversationwithDavidDeutsch”,WakingUppod-
cast, https://samharris.org/surviving-the-cosmos/ [accessed 06.02.2018].
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genes through evolution, all most species can ever hope for is a brief resis-
tance against a near-inevitable wave of rolling genocide. As shown by all
those extinctions, very few species have ever managed to escape that tide.
e lesson is unavoidable: environments, in the natural course of events,
nearly always kill the species that live within them.
Luckily, We, as a species, have reached a certain break-out capacity—
we have developed the ability to create explanatory knowledge, rather than
merely being reliant upon our gene knowledge, just as all other species are.
And considering, as Deutsch explains, that there exists an intimatemarriage
between explaining the world and controlling the world, this capacity to ex-
plain without limit, aords us a distinct weapon in our battle for survival.
is is a poorly understood, yet fundamental truism of the physical world.
It was explanatory knowledge that allowed our ancestors to successfully sur-
vive and escape the Great Ri Valley (though it is almost entirely lost to the
majority of us now), and it is explanatory knowledge that keeps us alive,
and occasionally thriving, in environments today (environments that would
otherwise be death traps). ere is no such thing as a friendly, hospitable
environment—they only seem so occasionally by virtue of what the inhabi-
tants actually know.
To this point, Deutsch is not being, in any real way, controversial. He is
walking a rather standard understanding of natural history, anthropology,
evolution, and the reach of explanations. Yet a problem still exists, and it
is what motivates Deutsch in his push-back against the sustainability move-
ment: the immediate descendants of ourmigration fromAfrica, people who
were nearly biologically identical to ourselves in terms of brains, and cer-
tainly in terms of the capacity for explanatory knowledge, still went on liv-
ing miserable and desperate lives on the borderline of death. As Deutsch
explains, their “ability to make progress remained almost unused.”2
By simply consulting the surrounding technology, any future archaeol-
ogist, aer stumbling upon the remains of anyone of Us, would be able to
accurately place the time period in which we lived (likely down to the exact
year in question). is is in stark contrast to how we analyse those rst hu-
man civilizations. Artefacts (technology) from those periods oen cannot
be placed with any more accuracy than timeframes of 10 000 years. Tech-
nology just was not changing fast enough to allow for better measurements.
Inventions, such as improvements in hunting tools, painting techniques,
or even re itself, were extremely uncommon. So much so that through
the period of any individual’s life—from the perspective of their existence
2 David Deutsch “A new way to explain explanation”, TEDGlobal 2009,
https://www.ted.com/talks/david_deutsch_a_new_way_to_explain_explanation/
transcript [accessed 06.02.2018].
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alone—nothing ever improved. Yet through this stagnation, they were try-
ing desperately for the opposite: “In every aspect of their lives they wished
for progress, just as we do, but they failed almost completely to make any.
ey didn’t know how to.”3
And, Deutsch believes that the “tragedy of that protracted stagnation
isn’t suciently recognized.”4 at tragedy is that the extreme suering and
hardship that dened such periods—nearly all of human history—was not
a necessary part of human development, not an unfortunate stepping stone
to something better, but rather an entirely unnecessary experience resulting
from the near-complete stasis that dened such historical periods. is is
the core of Deutsch’s complaint, this is why “sustainability,” as it is under-
stood by the complementary meanings of “providing” and “unchanging” is
such a dangerous notion. e idea of sustainability involves a certain Gar-
den of Eden-type thinking. Essentially it involves imagining that there exists
a non-dangerous, stable way of life, that is perennially free from existential
problems, and where further progress and creativity is not needed. But this
dees everythingwe know about theworld around us—environments never,
ever, sustain anything!
And it is due to this reality about environments that we just do not have
any real record of most of the static, unchanging societies that have existed
in the past—they do not survive long enough to leave a mark on history.
at is because the rst major problem that came their way—the rst time
that they needed to innovate in order to survive—became a hurdle too far
and they were destroyed, wiped-out by their inability to make progress.
e history of humanity is a history of death and failure. . .up until the
enlightenment that is. Butwhat actually changed at this time? Whatmade all
the dierence? Correctly dened by Deutsch, it was a commitment to rapid,
open-ended progress—a fundamental rejection of sustainability and an ac-
ceptance that “we shall never reach anything like an unproblematic state”
(Deutsch 2011, 445). All progress (the solving of problems) produces new
problems, but they are also “better” problems, and the only way to survive
in the long term is to make a commitment to keep moving forward in the
face of this reality. At the time of the enlightenment, for the rst time in all
of human history, we developed “the capacity to deal with unforeseen, and
unforeseeable failure” (Deutsch 2011, 437). From this position, we should
3 David Deutsch “A new way to explain explanation”, TEDGlobal 2009,
https://www.ted.com/talks/david_deutsch_a_new_way_to_explain_explanation/
transcript [accessed 06.02.2018].




never have, and it was inconceivable that we would, ever look back at the
periods of stagnation and suering with any sort of romance and envy. But,
as Deutsch shows with signicant clarity, the problem of global warming
has, inexplicably, now caused us to do just that.
3. Climate change
e existential risks associated with climate change are unquestionably real.
As institutes and governmental bodies around the world are increasingly
committing resources to the modelling and testing of climate change hy-
potheses, and as a consensus of research begins to mount up in support of
the theory, it is—in the absence of any new proof of falsication—impossible
to deny thatwe are living on a rapidlywarming planet and that our behaviour
(carbonoutput) is signicantly contributing to thiswarming (Oreskes 2007).
However, it is also a fact of our understanding of climate science, that by the
time that accurate explanatory theories were rst emerging, it was, by any
reasonable consideration, already too late to avoid catastrophe.
Although a series of estimates on CO2 and other gases such as methane
and their warming impact on our atmosphere were being formed as early as
the 19th century, the rstmodern, thorough, assessment of climate change in
terms of CO2 emissions was undertaken in America in 1965 under the au-
thority of the President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC). ereaer
the “Study of Man’s Impact on the Climate” and the “Study of Critical Envi-
ronmental Problems” came to a scientic conclusion that supported PSAC,
and climate change started becoming an issue of “some” international im-
portance. e World Climate Research Programme (WCRP) was formed,
the FirstWorld Climate Conference held in 1979, and later the rst major in-
ternational conferencewas held in 1985 inVillach, Austria, bringing together
global scientic consensus and intergovernmental cooperation (Edgerton
et al. 2008).
Leaked reports now show that companies such as ExxonMobil, the
world’s largest oil and gas company, knew about climate change 40-odd years
ago, yet kept publicly denying that the phenomenon was real. It would take
another decade before climate change would become a signicant issue of
public concern (Hall 2015). However at this time, in the late 1970’s and
early 1980’s, the researchwas still embryonic and “transitional,” andwas only
forced to public attention due to the Carter administration’s desire to start
utilizing domestic coal at dramatically increased capacity (Nierenberg et al.
2010). Yet even then, this was also a period in time when signicant sec-
tions of the scientic community were, instead of predicting and warning
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against a rapidly warming planet, cautioning against what they believed was
a rapidly approaching ice age.5
By sheer bad luck, our understanding of global warming came about at a
point atwhich itwas already too late to avoid disaster, calamity andupheaval.
Dangerously high levels of carbon were already concentrated in the atmo-
sphere, and due to the “lock-in” eect that such carbon has, the environ-
mental damage and warming eects were delayed, but also inevitable. And
beyond this, without the existence of viable alternative energy sources to
underscore development, a sudden halt on the use of carbon-heavy energy,
would also derail global progress in terms of poverty-reduction—a catastro-
phe in itself by any reasonablemeasure. And this does not even begin to deal
with the now demonstrated phenomena of our near-universal psychological
resistance to altering our standard of living (Hamilton 2015).
Responding to this, Deutsch believes that the solution has always been,
and should still be, obvious: the solution to our climate crisis will have to
involve developing new technologies for articially lowering temperatures
in the atmosphere (by removing carbon or by other means). Such research
currently includes: engineering soil to store carbon (Shackley et al. 2009),
developing new articial trees with 1000x the carbon capture capabilities
of ordinary trees (e Climate Institute 2014), engineering “chemical sinks”
that initiate carbon reactions with minerals to consume CO2 in carbonates
and by using solvents to directly capture CO2 from ambient air (Dubey et al.
2002), releasing large quantities of aerosols into the atmosphere to precip-
itate cooling (such as what happens in the case of a large volcano cloud)
(Sebastiao et al. 2011), iron fertilization in oceans, land management prac-
tices, aorestation, biomass combustion and the sequestration of carbon
within geological formations (Kriegler et al. 2013). Or failing all this, de-
veloping technologies for adapting to living at higher temperatures and the
new conditions that it will bring (UNFCCC 2006), including techniques for
maintaining sea ice at higher temperatures (Desch et al. 2017). However
such initiatives are fringe research, and as Deutsch points out, “neither su-
percomputers nor international treaties nor vast sums are devoted to them”
(Deutsch 2011, 441).
Rather they are devoted to a singular purpose—and one that does not
address the critical situation that we are already in, even if we were to drop
our carbon emissions overnight to zero.at narrow policy focus is: carbon
reduction by means of limiting economic activity.e “First World Climate
Conference” kicked this trend o in 1979, and then again in 1985 in Villach,
Austria. e proceeding conclusions included: 1. e warming of the cli-
5 Skeptical Science “What were climate scientists predicting in the 1970s?”, https://www.
skepticalscience.com/ice-age-predictions-in-1970s.htm [accessed 06.02.2018].
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mate was then already inevitable due to past emissions, 2. Human activity
was the problem, 3. We would need to reduce our consumption of oil and
coal, and generally reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, and 4. Future de-
velopment will have to be sacriced (Edgerton et al. 2008).
e narrow policy focus continued. In 1991, the Intergovernmental Ne-
gotiating Committee (INC) formed, and then led to the adoption of the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992. is
convention broke the world up into three annexes of responsibility as mea-
sured by levels of development (harm caused).e 1997 Kyoto protocols dug
a little deeper, distinguishing between “developed” and “developing” coun-
tries in terms of responsibility, and thereaer in terms of who should pay
the costs associated with carbon reduction (designating degrees of punish-
ment became the focus). A decade later with the “Bali Road Map,” the focus
was on achieving “full, eective and sustained implementation” of the Ky-
oto Protocols and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change.
In 2009, before the formal discussions broke down, the “informal”
Copenhagen Accords highlighted the same reduction imperative, a veri-
cation system for the reductions, and once again a distinction between de-
veloped and developing countries (now with the added proviso that these
countries need to nance sustainable methods of development in the devel-
oping world). Durban 2011 followed the same trend, as did the 2012 “Con-
tinuation of Kyoto,” and the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement once again re-
asserted the need to: 1. Stop using greenhouse gases as soon as possible, 2.
Keep temperature increases below a “sustainable” level of -2C (3.6F) and, 3.
To increase social pressure on states to achieve these targets.
We are utterly consumed by the idea of punishing economic activity as a
means of limiting our carbonoutput, and thereby addressing the problems of
climate change. Despite everything we know about the problem indicating
that this would not help us avert catastrophe, it is a dangerous line of think-
ing for another reason altogether: it is a return to the idea of sustainability
and stasis. Targeting carbon reduction constitutes a tactic of prevention and
delay, which occasionally do prove useful, but in-and-of themselves never
amount to a strategy for the future. As David Deutsch explains: “If you have
been punched on the nose, then the science of medicine does not consist
of teaching you how to avoid punches . . . If medical science stopped seeking
cures and concentrated on prevention only, then it would achieve very little
of either”.6
6 David Deutsch “Chemical scum that dream of distant quasars”, TEDGlobal 2005, https:
//www.ted.com/talks/david_deutsch_on_our_place_in_the_cosmos/transcript [accessed
06.02.2018].
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Wehave, onmany previous occasions, been here before as a species. Cli-
mate change is by nomeans the rst existential crisis that has confronted us,
and importantly it will not be the last either. And this is where the real dan-
ger lays, if climate change pushes us away from a course of problem solving
and toward problem avoidance, if it pushes us back into a desire for the sta-
tus quo, then even if we are lucky enough to avoid its destruction, then the
next problem will almost certainly destroy us instead.
It is always tempting to imagine that seemingly large solutions, such as
those which are required for climate change, are out of our reach—that they
are just too hard, or not possible at all. But as Deutsch explains—and this
is the least controversial part of this thinking—any physical transformation
of the universe, as long as it is not forbidden by the laws of nature, is by
denition achievable given the right knowledge. Moreover, there is no valid
reason to imagine that the solution to the cooling of the biosphere should
be further out of our reach than the solution to developing without carbon
emissions. What we know for sure, through the history of our species, is
that “If we stop solving problems, we are doomed” (Deutsch 2011, 432).e
sustainability being proposed at all those climate conferences, and by nearly
all politicians and scientists, is the same sustainability that killed nearly all
life on this planet, as well as all of our cousin species. As Deutsch correctly
explains, most of us just have our ideas around the wrong way—We are not
the problem! Rather, “sustainability is the disease and people are the cure!”
(Deutsch 2011, 435).
4. In search of an explanation
So why are we expending all this energy in such a counterproductive way?
Deutsch does a conclusive job of explaining the break in our thinking on
the issue of climate change and sustainability, but he does not oer a reason
for that break. He does not oer an explanation for why we are making this
dangerous mistake and why we are—across cultures, across countries and
over a signicant period of time—pursuing such a strange policy direction,
andwhywe are doing sowith such uninching eagerness. Some of the likely,
though awed, explanations are:
1. It is just considered to be a good solution, that it will x the climate
problem before us.
But we know this cannot be true because, as already explained, limit-
ing carbon emissions is a preventative x for an already locked-in problem.
With such limitations already in place, and carbon emissions continuing to
increase, it will likely take decades before any signicant carbon reduction
is felt as a result of placing limitations on economic behaviour. And this
Jed Lea-Henry 107
misses the obvious criticism of: if carbon emissions dropped to zero today
we would still be facing catastrophe regardless.
2. It is the only option available to us.
is is never the case with anything. By denition we cannot know im-
provements in technology and knowledge in advance of us having them.
And as already shown, there are already a series of embryonic technologies
that have every chance of becoming better options for addressing climate
change.
3. It is the easier/more likely solution to the problem.
is just cannot be known. is is a claim about the nature of future
knowledge and an embracing of a way of thinking that involves imagining a
future without improvements. Any claim about “resource management” be-
ing the key to survival, involves the mistake of forgetting that resources do
not exist until knowledge (human knowledge) makes them so. Any phys-
ical property is a potential resource. So an approach that focusses on the
resources of today, is once again imagining a future of non-improvement.
And in this way, by the limiting of our carbon output via taxation or punitive
punishment, we are incentivising only a very narrow set of new technologies
(cleaner burning energy sources).
4. A lack of imagination—it is the lazy option.
ere is likely some truth in this. Doomsday prophecies have always
tended to talk in terms of nite resources and rates of decline/destruction,
along with criticisms regarding the hubris and overreach of careless human
beings. And in a pre-echo of the rendering that is to come, Friedrich Ni-
etzsche famously explained in “Human All-to-Human” that “to predict the
behaviour of ordinary people in advance, you only have to assume that they
will always try to escape a disagreeable situation with the smallest possible
expenditure of intelligence” (Nietzsche 1994). But even so, this is an incom-
plete picture because it ignores the huge levels of time and energy that is
being invested into carbon reduction solutions.
5. Peer pressure—the moral force of a consensus position.
Once again, there is likely some truth in this explanation, but also much
more that is le unexplained. Aer a critical mass, forming behind a moral-
izing policy platforming, is reached on any issue, a snowballing psychology
of agreement is an entirely plausible phenomenon; a phenomenonwhere sci-
entists and politicians are discouraged to seek new or alternative solutions
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out of social fear. However, it should also be noted that a shi in policy from
limiting carbon emissions to removing carbon or cooling the atmosphere,
would also be politically very helpful because it makes obsolete the political
debate over just how much “We” are contributing to global warming as op-
posed to “natural” warming. When the focus is on removing it rather than
limiting it, then it does not matter how it got there in the rst place.
ere is however, a better explanation—and despite the fact that we need
to keep a role open for individual creative decision-making—that accounts
for themass phenomenological, cross-cultural, cross-political, and enduring
nature of our commitment to the policy of carbon limitation.is explana-
tion is written through the language of those myriad climate agreements,
as well as the language of most individual state policies concerning carbon
reduction by means of limiting economic activity.at explanation is “pun-
ishment!”
5. Nietzsche and the joys of punishment
e Villach Conference (1985) acknowledged that: 1. Harm had already
been locked-in due to carbon emissions, 2. at “We” were to blame, and
3. at we would now need to pay a cost for that harm in terms of sacri-
ced standards of living (Edgerton et al. 2008).e United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (1992) then consciously divided up
that “sacrice-owed” in proportional terms of how responsible each state is
for the climate harm already registered. e 1997 Kyoto protocols crystal-
ized this division of responsibility by distinguishing between “developed”
and “developing” countries (distinctions of harm caused). And the 2009
“informal” Copenhagen Accords and the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement fo-
cussed on the need for verication systems for monitoring the implementa-
tion of the punishment (reductions in standards of living by reductions in
carbon emissions).
All these conferences have sort to designate responsibility, have sort to
set arbitrary upper limits on acceptable carbon impacts, and have then sort
to punish all those in breach—even going so far as to hand out “calcula-
tion kits” (Lenzen 1997) so that people, businesses, and states can painstak-
ingly calculate their “historical responsibility” and then painstakingly keep
up with inventory reporting (Friman and Strandberg 2014).
Similarly, the key policy initiatives that individual states and suprana-
tional organisations have tended to pursue in order to satisfy these desig-
nated responsibilities—namely carbon taxes and emissions trading schemes
—all proportion nancial punishment according to individual contributions
to the harm caused, in terms of carbon emissions. And to dig a little deeper
into this desire for punishment, at the Paris Climate Agreement when it be-
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came apparent that an international administered punishment regime could
not be agreed upon, the conference settled on the commitment to name and
shame countries that breach their obligations instead.ereby compromis-
ing with social punishment wherevermaterial punishment was not possible.
e policy parameters of the desire to limit carbon output as a means to
address global warming are dominated by calculations and apportionment
of blame.is oen manifests in the form of ridiculous political and hyper-
moralized debates concerning the adding-up of who put most of the car-
bon in the atmosphere and then holding themmost responsible for limiting
their reductions.is is a singular fascination with the idea of “punishment”
rather than “solution.” And even in terms of our current understandings of
punishment, this seems over the top and obsessive. But for Friedrich Niet-
zsche this would have made absolute sense, and would have been entirely
predictable, because he knew that “punishment” is just not what we tend
to think it is; that it holds an entirely misunderstood value to us as human
beings.
eories of Punishment tend to be explained in terms of “deterrence,”
“retribution,” “reformation,” “reparation” and “prevention;” and what our
response should be to bad behaviour in order to achieve these outcomes—
eectively, a “sentencing issue.” But this understanding of punishment as a
form of behaviour modication is, according to Nietzsche, a modern gloss
on its real and sustaining purpose. Rather than being a well thought out and
carefully structured response, punishment comes to us naturally, as a blind
instinct. Punishment serves a means unto itself—we enjoy it.
In order to justify modern conceptions of punishment we have to be-
gin by: Firstly outlining the intention (goals for the practice). Secondly, by
requiring that the practice succeeds in these intentions. irdly, by show-
ing that the punishment is the only way to achieve the desired outcomes.
And fourthly, that there is an intrinsic philosophical justication for not just
the punishment, but also for the desired outcomes as well (Bedau and Kelly
2015). Nietzsche believes that, despite convincing ourselves otherwise, we
never actually satisfy this process, that is, because we deceive ourselves at
the rst of the four principles—we rarely understand why we are punish-
ing in the rst place. For Nietzsche, punishment has nothing to do with the
“moral character” of the oender (Lipkin 1988). is subterranean “true”
motivation oen becomes explicit when people are actually asked to justify
the punishing of oenders. At which time people will instinctively tend to
place that justication in the context of “outrage” concerning the underlying
action, not in the context of a carefully structured path to rehabilitation and
social benet (Sunstein 2004).
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A philologist by training, Nietzsche pulls away this modern superim-
position of acceptable purposes, and reveals a more fundamental aspect of
human nature as the deep root of our desire to punish. Historically unre-
lated to the ideas of “teaching,” “learning,” and “deterring,” punishment is
actually something enacted out of “anger,” anger directed at someone who
has caused harm. is is an idea that “damage somehow has an equivalent
and really can be paid o. . . through the pain of the culprit.” Rather than a
designation that “the criminal deserves punishment, because he could have
acted otherwise,” punishment owes its genealogy to an idea of “debt owed.”
is is evident in the link between the German words guilt = [Schuld]; and
debtor = [Schulden] (Nietzsche 2008, 44–45). Justice has always been un-
derscored by the idea that: “Everything can be paid o, everything must be
paid o” (Nietzsche 2008, 54). e feeling of “guilt” as being on the wrong
end of the “buyer and seller, debtor and creditor” relationship is found in the
records of every known civilization, along with the designation of “pride” to
those on the superior side of this relationship. Punishment is imbued with a
“sense of exchange, contract, debt, law, obligation, compensation” and above
all else, “measurement” (Nietzsche 2008, 51).
Punishment has always taken ondimensions that satisfy these categories.
Rather than simply as a means to hold certain people to account for their
actions, punishment has traditionally, just as with debt, been transferable to
wives, husbands, children and other family members. at is because “in
order to impress repayment as a duty and obligation sharply upon his con-
science, the debtor contractually pledges to the creditor in the event of non-
payment something which he otherwise still “possesses,” something over
which he still has power” (Nietzsche 2008, 45), and this relationship still ex-
ists today though generally only in terms of property and/or labour. Punish-
ment, for Nietzsche, is the idea that everything can be paid o in some way;
that all harm caused has its equivalent and its price—and oen that price is
“the pain of the culprit” (Nietzsche 2008, 45). Traditionally, the creditor in
any relationship could and would extract payment from debtors in terms of
torture and humiliation—it was common practice to “excise as much esh
as seemed commensurate with the size of the debt” (Nietzsche 2008, 45–46).
Embedded in this element of punishment as a “creditor-debtor” rela-
tionship is, for Nietzsche, the unavoidable presence of “pleasure.” Because
the analysis of punishment so far begs the question: “in what way does the
physical suering of a debtor compensate for their unpaid debt?” To the extent
that the anger and fury of the “aggrieved creditor,” or of the broader society
in terms of criminality or environmental degradation, can be vented on the
object of that anger. Punishment in this sense oers up the “hated enemy,”
“prostrate” and “defenceless,” removed of any natural rights to protection
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and hopes of “grace” (Nietzsche 2008, 53). Punishment is the “upliing feel-
ing of being able to despise and mistreat someone as “beneath him” and the
“entitlement and right to cruelty” (Nietzsche 2008, 46), as a means of ex-
change between aggrieved parties.
e tendency here might be to push back against Nietzsche, and invoke
the “concept of revenge” as the real purpose of punishment in light of its
“debtor-creditor” foundations. is, for Nietzsche, is a natural, but entirely
misguided response. It is an attempt to seek a more palatable explanation
for a value (punishment) that “runs through the whole history of higher cul-
ture,” that we have now entrenched into penal codes, and have oen elevated
to “divine” status (Nietzsche 2008, 47). But this alternative attempt at expla-
nation in no way answers the previous question of: “in what way does the
physical suering of a debtor compensate for their unpaid debt?”
ere is just muchmore to support the idea that we seek punishment for
the singular reason that we get tremendous pleasure from inicting suering
on people who have wronged us in some way. And historically punishment
has taken on a festive quality (Nietzsche 2008, 47). It was once common
practice for noble households to employ someone to simply exist as an av-
enue to “vent one’s malice and cruel teasing.” Just as royal, or aristocratic,
weddings and other large public festivals “were inconceivable without exe-
cutions, torture, or perhaps even an auto-da-fe” (Nietzsche 2008, 48). e
festive nature of cruelty in punishment is written into the documents of the
three great monotheisms, and even intoHomer’s account of the TrojanWars
(Nietzsche 2008, 50). ere is no greater festivity than that of cruelty, and
there is no more satisfying exaction of cruelty than that of punishment (Ni-
etzsche 2008, 48).
Nietzsche’s concept of punishment oers a useful explanation for the
narrowness of our policy pursuits concerning global warming and climate
change. For why we are, across cultures, across countries and over a signi-
cant period of time—pursuing such a strange (in terms of the limited impact
that such policies would have even if they could reduce carbon emissions to
zero tomorrow), likely dangerous (in terms of embracing sustainability), and
counterproductive (in terms of all the lost energy, resources and creativity
that could be otherwise applied to nding a solution to the problem rather
than just a means of delay) policy direction. And for why we are doing so
with such absolute and unquestioning eagerness.
Imposing restrictions on carbon emissions according to carefully pro-
portioned calculations as to who is most responsible for causing what per-
centage of the problem we are currently facing, represents a carefully struc-
tured punishment regime—punishment in the form of restricting economic
activity and therefore also reducing standards of living. But to pursue a pol-
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icy of removing carbon, or of cooling the biosphere by other means, would
do something entirely unsatisfying—that is, it would remove the need for
punishment at all. Because to discover ameans of removing carbon from the
biosphere is to essentially create a world whereby the behaviour of polluting
countries, polluting organisations and polluting individualswould no longer
constitute any sort of “harm caused.” e seemingly reckless behaviour of
the past and present would have to go unpunished. And as Nietzsche shows,
this is an extremely unpleasant psychological reality formost people because
it denies us the pleasure and satisfaction of collecting a pound of esh as a
means of ensuring that people pay o their moral debts.
If David Deutsch’s proposed change of policy direction were embraced,
and if it became possible to eectively cool the biosphere, it is plausible that
many people in the sustainability movement, despite achieving all they have
ever wanted on climate change, would not be happy. Because they would
likely feel that the people responsible for the problem would not have been
forced to learn their lesson, because they would not have been punished. For
example, if the technology were to become available that would allow us to
consistently, cheaply and reliably bring people back from the dead (as un-
likely as it is), therebymaking the crime of murder not a crime at all because
the harm caused by the behaviour (the life lost) would always be reversed,
it would still likely feel wrong to not punish those who committed murder.
It would be psychologically unsatisfying not to exact some punishment re-
gardless.
6. By way of a conclusion
As David Deutsch explains, sustainability, and the commitment to prob-
lem avoidance rather than problem solving, are very dangerous ideas. And
our near-universally pursued policy direction in response to the problem of
global warming is a commitment to both those ideas byway of trying to limit
carbon emissions by themeans of limiting economic activity. As hard as this
might be to make sense of, a good explanation—account of reality—as to
why we are making this mistake can be found through the language of out-
rage at the “harmful behaviour,” the parsing of that harm through elaborate
punishment regimes, through the painstaking apportioning of responsibil-
ity, the painstaking creation of verication systems, the implementation of
social pressure/social punishment above and beyond material punishment,
through the failure of advocates to properly justify their desired punishment
regimes in terms of solutions to the problem, and especially when people
seem to take great satisfaction and pleasure in something (punishment) that
should be an unpleasant and undesirable part of our social life.at good ex-
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planation is the “debtor-creditor” and “pleasure-driven” conception of pun-
ishment that is put forward by Friedrich Nietzsche.
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